For the first time, China has swapped the leadership positions of two major departments: Li Ganjie, Minister of the Central Organization Department of the CPC, moving to Minister of the United Front Work Department, while Dai Taifeng (Thạch Thái Phong) transitions from the United Front to Minister of the Central Organization Department. Some analysts say this switch reflects a weakening of Xi Jinping’s faction and the rise of the so-called “Deng faction.” The anti-Xi camp reportedly no longer waits and has taken over personnel power from Xi’s hands. This marks the beginning of a purge of Xi’s trusted allies across both party and government systems.
On April 2, Hong Kong’s Sing Tao Daily and the South China Morning Post quoted anonymous sources that Dai Taifeng had been appointed Minister of the Central Organization Department, while Li Ganjie would assume leadership of the United Front. The Chinese government officially confirmed the switch that evening.
The Party’s website under the Central Organization Department announced that on Wednesday (April 2), Dai, as the Minister of the Central Organization Department, listened to reports about the implementation of research and educational activities to execute central directives. According to Xinhua News Agency, on the same day Li, as Minister of the United Front Work Department, presided over a forum on democratic supervision in ecological protection of the Yangtze River, organized by the central democratic parties and non-party members in Beijing.
Overturning Xi’s Personnel Arrangements
Commentator Wen Zhao analysed in his self-media show that behind this personnel adjustment lies a shift in the power-sharing model: one faction rising, another falling. Wen pointed out Dai Taifeng is 68 years old, with little chance of promotion to state-level leader or Politburo Standing Committee member. With more than two years until the 21st National Congress, this suggests Dai is a transitional figure, installed by some faction to control the critical task of senior cadre selection. Wen concluded: “This appointment must be a faction seeking to overthrow Xi Jinping’s personnel arrangements, disable all arrangements for Xi’s re-election, and reduce Xi to a commander without troops. If the alleged incident involving Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong is true, it not only cuts Xi’s power in the military, but has cut into his underwear.”
Wen noted that Wang Huning accompanied Dai on many inspection trips, showing that Dai strongly supported Wang. The appointment of Dai as President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2022 could have been orchestrated by Wang, because the two have long been allied. “Dai and Wang have a close link, and Wang’s role in future power structures will be prominent.” Regardless of the exact scenario, this is the result of the weakening of Xi Jinping’s loyal faction.
Xi’s Faction Loses, ‘Deng’ Faction Gains
Commentator Tang Jingyuan on his self-media channel analysed that this post-swap is effectively a promotion for Dai but a demotion for Li Ganjie. Li succeeds Chen Xi; both are closely aligned with the “Tsinghua faction,” and Li has always been viewed as a Xi loyalist.
Dai is somewhat special. Although he interacted with Xi during 2007–12 when Xi was incoming as president, Dai also has ties to Li Keqiang — they were classmates in the law faculty at Peking University in the late ’70s and early ’80s. Furthermore, Dai served a nine-year stint as associate dean of the Central Party School under three presidents: Hu Jintao, Zeng Qinghong and Xi Jinping. “Thus Dai is not entirely from Xi’s camp; he is considered linked to the ‘Deng faction’ (H Jintao & Li Keqiang).” In March 2016, when Hu Jintao had retired, Dai visited him at home in Jiangsu — demonstrating their personal closeness. Tang argues this personnel swap is actually the weakening of Xi’s camp and the elevation of the Deng faction. That the South China Morning Post — a non-Xi aligned paper — was first to break the story furthers that inference.
Anti-Xi Faction No Longer Patient — Personnel Power Taken
Tang said Xi Jinping not only lost military power, but now his control over party personnel and organization has officially been stripped. “This is a strong signal that a major purge of Xi’s intimates and army is about to begin.” Previously we had purges in the military; next may come in both the party and government systems. “It reflects time urgency — the anti-Xi faction no longer has patience or the luxury to wait until 2027 to effect personnel changes through normal procedures.”
Standing Committee Coup? Veterans of the ‘Deng faction’ Take Control of the Politburo?
Tang suggests that Xi’s inability to control the Central Organization Department — a key power node — shows he no longer controls the Politburo. “The only plausible explanation is that the five Standing Committee members loyal to Xi have turned, or even all have done so. The real power running the Politburo is at least partly in the hands of the core of the ‘Deng faction,’ such as Wen Jiabao.”
American political commentator Chen Pak Kong says Dai Taifeng’s promotion clearly involves veteran politicians, possibly Hu Jintao or Hu Jintao together with Zeng Qinghong. He notes that currently military power is with Zhang Youxia, while party personnel power may return to Hu Jintao, because Dai and Li Keqiang were classmates. “Right now, three people born in 1942 wield influence: Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and Hu Deying.” If the elder statesmen can play this role then Zeng Qinghong may also be in the mix.
Earlier, independent commentator Tai Shenkun revealed in free-media that a domestic friend claimed, “Party power has now been transferred to three people born in 1942: Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Hu Deying.” According to this source, after the Third Plenum last year, top CPC leadership returned to a collective leadership model. “Now, for Xi Jinping it is just a matter of announcing his resignation. The timeline for that official announcement may not be long, and could happen at the Fourth Plenum.”
At last year’s 75th anniversary celebration of the Communist Party of China, the seating placements of elder statesmen Wen Jiabao and Li Shuhuan beside Xi Jinping sparked intense speculation. Some analysts believe that after Xi fell ill during the Third Plenum, the CPC’s power configuration shifted, Xi’s power waned, and the central leadership returned to a greater collective-rule model.
Link: vanhoa
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